A Quarter of A Million at Risk: The Fall of El Fasher

Atrocity Alert

19 September 2025

Read the full alert.

Introduction

The city of El Fasher is falling to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), according to the 18 September report by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL).

Time is running out for the estimated 260,000 civilians, including 130,000 children, trapped inside of El Fasher, the final battleground in Darfur between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF. The RSF’s ongoing attempt to capture the North Darfur capital is the next stage of their genocide against non-Arab populations. Global paralysis  in the response to the Sudan war is contributing to the loss of lives across the country. However, decisive action by the international community can still prevent further atrocities in El Fasher including acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The RSF perpetrated mass atrocities in Zamzam, Sudan’s largest camp for IDPs in April 2025 and troops “spoke of plans to ‘clean El Fasher’ of its non-Arab, and especially Zaghawa community” reports MSF. In these well documented attacks, the RSF and their allied militias “deliberately targeted non-Arab communities” with survivors reporting the targeted killing of civilians, the razing of civilian buildings including homes, and the large scale perpetration of sexual violence. These serious violations should not be viewed in isolation, rather as a pattern of systematic targeting of non-Arab communities which the RSF will continue if they capture El Fasher from SAF and their allied Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signatories.

The RSF has besieged the North Darfur capital for over 500 days, using starvation as a weapon of warfare by blocking food and lifesaving humanitarian assistance from entering. They have built earthen walls that almost completely encircle the city and prevent civilians from fleeing. Over 470,000 people have been displaced from El Fasher and surrounding areas since the start of the siege in May 2024. However, conflict between the belligerents and their respective allied militias has significantly escalated in the past three weeks, as have serious violations and atrocity crimes against the civilian population.

The RSF now likely controls the former UNAMID compound (the JPA headquarters), as well as Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The UAE-backed RSF is less than a kilometer away from SAF’s 6th Infantry Base, the closest they have penetrated into El Fasher since the start of the war. Civilians within the city report intense ground clashes, constant daily shelling on civilian areas, and daily casualties due to the fighting. Sudanese civil society groups and mutual aid initiatives continue to be the only source of humanitarian support in the city and urgently need support in order to provide life-saving assistance to their communities.

In other areas of North Darfur, SAF is also violating the UN Darfur arms embargo,  indiscriminately killing civilians through drone attacks. There are also reports of SAF and the JPA forces preventing civilians from fleeing. 

Atrocity Dynamics

There is a significant risk of ongoing atrocities in El Fasher including the perpetration of  genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The RSF continues to rape, summarily execute, and enforcedly disappear civilians based on their ethnic identity with African tribes being particularly targeted. These most recent attacks match the patterns of attack identified by the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) which found that the RSF and allies “continued coordinated large-scale attacks on civilians as part of a deliberate policy targeting non-Arab communities”. International action is needed immediately to prevent the RSF’s further commissioning of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (IHL) and (IHRL) against the civilian population.

Preventing civilians from fleeing

●      The RSF has built over 38km of earthen walls (berms) at the edges of the city to “control population flow from all directions to and from El-Fasher” according to Yale HRL. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that there are no safe exit routes from El Fasher.

●      The berms will allow the RSF and allied militias to continue to strangulate the civilian population by blocking the entry of food and medicine into the city and obstructing civilians from fleeing.

●      Testimony from civilians who recently fled El Fasher recount that men and adolescent boys are being killed on the road and that leaving El Fasher is now more dangerous than staying despite the constant daily shelling.

Targeted killing of civilians

●      The RSF killed at least 89 civilians in Abu Shouk IDP camp and El Fasher city In the ten-day period up to 20 August, although the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that the actual figure is expected to be much higher. Data collection is hindered due to the ongoing telecommunications blackout.

●      Armed actors reportedly affiliated with the RSF abducted over 50 civilians from Abu Shouk camp from August 23-25, according to the Darfur Network for Human Rights.

●      On 1 September, at least 27 civilians were killed across El Fasher with Saudi Hospital reportedly receiving over 100 casualties. On 12 September, the RSF killed at least 7 people and injured more than ten in artillery shelling on Nasr and Abu Shouk.

Conflict-related sexual violence

●      Civilians who have fled El Fasher or are trapped in the city recount numerous stories of women and girls being raped by the RSF, including at least 23 children who have been raped or sexually abused since the start of the siege.

●      Survivors of the Zamzam attack recount the RSF’s widespread use of rape and gang rape, according to the UN Human Rights Office.

Torture and arbitrary detentions

●      The RSF and allied militias have systematically targeted civilians throughout the siege campaign, killing hundreds. People fleeing El Fasher have faced torture and other forms of extreme violence, according to MSF.

Attacks on critical civilian infrastructure

The RSF’s concerted attacks on El Fasher have now resulted in the collapse of the healthcare system in the city.

●      35 hospitals have been destroyed since the RSF began their siege on El Fasher.

●      The RSF injured seven people in an artillery attack on the emergency and trauma unit of Southern Hospital, forcing the suspension of operations on 23 August.

●      The RSF and allies continue to shell and target critical civilian infrastructure. The RSF killed at least 24 people and injured 55 in an attack on the central market and the Awlad al-Reef neighbourhood on 28 August.

Ethnically-motivated hate speech

●      In self-recorded footage, RSF fighters frequently use ethnic hate speech against the civilian population, including the term “falinigay”, a derogatory ethnic slur. The ethnic dimensions and historic grievances cannot be ignored and will continue to influence atrocity dynamics.

Starvation as a weapon of warfare

●      The UN has been unable to deliver aid to the city for over 16 months despite famine being declared in El Fasher since December 2024. Starving civilians are eating ambaz, animal feed made of peanut shells which is now running out as all food stocks in the city have been exhausted. Footage reportedly shows the RSF capturing civilians who tried to bring food into the city in August 2025. In the recording, the RSF fighter declares that when the camera stops, the young men will be killed.

●      UN humanitarian convoys travelling to El Fasher and other areas of North Darfur were attacked and destroyed on 2 June and 20 August, despite all warring parties being notified of the convoy and its route.

Denying quarter to PoWs

●      RSF fighters have recorded themselves denying quarter to captured SAF and JPA soldiers.

These war crimes and crimes against humanity constitute a pattern of the RSF and allies systematically targeting the non-Arab civilian population in and around El Fasher. Only a small window for atrocity prevention remains to save lives and uphold IHL in and around El Fasher.

The United States is the only country to have determined genocide in Sudan since 2023. The absence of similar determinations globally is driven by a lack of political will rather than a lack of evidence. There is significant evidence of both the RSF and SAF’s perpetration of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including evidence collected by the Fact Finding Mission for Sudan and the International Criminal Court. The international community is collectively failing to uphold the responsibility to protect.

If concerned states continue to allow the further commissioning of atrocity crimes by the RSF before taking action, they will likely be in violation of the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the responsibility of all states to prevent and punish genocide, as well as complicity in violations of other jus cogens norms such as the prohibition of torture. If states choose to not uphold these peremptory norms of international law, the already imperrilled international legal system is at risk of collapse under the weight of inaction and indifference. RSF troops have said that they intend to ‘clean’ El Fasher of the Zaghawa population. The international community must act now.

Political Dynamics and Scenario Planning

The RSF seeks to capture El Fasher for its symbolic and strategic significance. There is a perception that the fall of El Fasher to the RSF and allies will simplify the resolution of the Sudan war due to clearly delineated areas of control, with the RSF’s parallel government ruling over all of Darfur and SAF controlling Sudan’s eastern areas and the capital. However, this belief in an expedited path to peace and conflict resolution is misguided. If the RSF captures El Fasher from SAF and allies, atrocity crimes and serious violations of IHL will accelerate and the conflict will grow more protracted.

Tribal Dynamics and Historical Grievances

Historical grievances that have underpinned conflict in Sudan for over two decades, such as land rights and marginalisation, have never been redressed. The commissioning of further atrocities across the North Darfur region risks re-igniting these intercommunal conflicts, as is already occurring. For example, traditional pastoral routes are currently inaccessible due to indiscriminate aerial bombardment by SAF, including through unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Conflict Dynamics Across Sudan

If the RSF captures El Fasher, the group will have solidified their control over all of Darfur except the territory held by the Sudan Liberation Movement under the leadership of Abdul Wahid al Nur (SLM-AW). El Fasher is an optimal staging ground for intensified attacks on the Kordofan region. The center of conflict in Sudan has already shifted to the Kordofan region, but the fall of El Fasher would allow the RSF to secure greater control over the northern portion of the B26 road and a strong base for staging further offensives to capture the Kordofans. El Fasher would also increase the RSF’s ability to use key supply routes extending to the Libyan border.

These patterns of violations and siege tactics are not unique to El Fasher. However, reporting on these contexts is hampered by the ongoing telecommunications blackout including the recent banning of WhatsApp voice and video calls by the Sudanese Telecommunications and Post Regulatory Authority (TPRA).

Regional Dynamics

The fragility of the east Africa region is currently being under-assessed. The RSF and allied militias risk broader regional destabilization by continuing to perpetrate atrocity crimes against civilians in El Fasher and the surrounding areas. The UAE’s failure to limit the RSF’s atrocities in El Fasher may jeopardize the stability of their allies in Chad and Libya given that the Zaghawa population spans vast areas of Darfur and Eastern Chad, including El Fasher city. Further attacks against non-Arab communities in North Darfur risk triggering an expansion of the mobilisation of populations across borders to serve as armed combatants in this protracted conflict. Hundreds of Chadian soldiers have deserted to join Zaghawa militias fighting against the RSF in Sudan, reports International Crisis Group. This also risks destabilising Chadian President Deby’s power basis and system of patronage.

Further mass displacement from North Darfur into Chad could destabilise refugee camps in eastern Chad which have received more than 100,000 Sudanese refugees since April whilst also facing severe reductions in international humanitarian assistance due to funding cuts. Rather than newly displaced civilians settling in established camps such as Iridimi, Touloum, Alacha, Aboutengue, and Metche, refugees may instead be displaced into other areas of Chad which could generate further conflict between new arrivals and host populations, a situation that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has already described as “a catastrophic breaking point”. Further forced displacement into the extremely fragile Central African Republic is also likely as civilians seek refuge in areas beyond the control of the RSF.

South Sudan is already suffering as a result of the conflict in Sudan. In February 2024, a key oil pipeline that transfers oil from South Sudan to the Red Sea was seriously damaged; it has not yet been repaired because the damage is located in an area of Sudan where ongoing fighting makes repair work unsafe and unfeasible. The South Sudanese economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues.

The ongoing fighting in Sudan is likely to further complicate South Sudan’s political, economic, and security landscape, which is already extremely fragile. Both the RSF and SAF have established relationships with different factions in the political struggle over who will succeed ailing President Salva Kiir. If the succession reignites the brutal civil war that killed 400,000 between 2013 and 2018, fighting will likely spread across the Sudan-South Sudan border. This will eliminate safe areas for civilians and constrict routes for humanitarian aid to reach displaced populations. Additionally, the Sudanese authorities will be unable to provide good offices as a mediator between the South Sudanese factions, which was essential to reaching a peace agreement in the prior civil war.

Further atrocity crimes in North Darfur will likely drive increased displacement into southern Libya where an estimated 500 Sudanese refugees are arriving each day to Alkufra and are met with insufficient resources to support them. There are also reports of RSF relying on key supply lines through General Haftar’s areas of control. Serious destabilisation in the southern state could increase instability within other areas of Libya, running counter to the UAE goal of Haftar cementing control over the entire country. Though the RSF’s military capture of all of Darfur is in the interests of the UAE, further destabilisation of the region, including  its key allies and proxies is not. It is in the best interests of the UAE to stop all RSF violations of IHL in and around El Fasher to protect its broader geopolitical interests.

Internal Political Dynamics

Both SAF and the RSF have recently established ‘civilian’ governments as they engage in their quest for regional and international legitimacy.

The RSF’s so called ‘Unity Government’ falsely claims to be civilian in nature, yet the RSF is fighting alongside allied militias such as Al Hadi Idriss’ Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council (SLM-TC), and Taher Hajar’s Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF). These fighters continue to systematically violate international humanitarian law. The leaders of these groups should be sanctioned for serious and systematic violations of IHL as the RSF and allies repeatedly attack Saudi and Southern Hospitals and the El Fasher community kitchens.

The ‘Unity Government’ is seeking international legitimacy by claiming their civilian composition. However, Tasees has never been a civilian entity given that the President, Mohamad ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo is the leader of the RSF and the Vice President, Abdulaziz Al-Hilu is the leader of one of the largest armed groups in Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N Al Hilu faction). This government will never demonstrate their capacity as a governing force, nor claim any international or domestic legitimacy whilst its members continue to commit atrocity crimes against the civilian population. Meanwhile, these political and military leaders continue to repeat history by assuming positions of power within government whilst failing to address any of the root causes of conflict or significant humanitarian needs of their ethno-tribal communities.

Though the goal of the RSF is to control all of Darfur to improve its negotiating position, the economic bases of such a government are also questionable and would likely rely on a combination of natural resource extraction including artisanal gold, and extreme taxation and extortion of the civilian population.

The RSF is employing siege tactics in other areas of the country, including in North and South Kordofan in coordination with the SPLM-N Al Hilu. Though the current political partnership between the RSF and SPLM-N is holding, this may collapse following the RSF’s capture of El Fasher due to tension between their interests in the Kordofan region, with Al-Hilu wanting to control the entire region whereas Hemedti seeks to capture SAF bases.

Members of the RSF’s Tasees civilian alliance continue to falsely assert that there are no civilians left in El Fasher and that the remaining population are all combatants – which would constitute one of the world’s largest fighting forces. The RSF and members of the Tasees government used similar rhetoric prior to the RSF ground assault on Zamzam IDP camp in April 2025 and this has consistently been challenged by Sudanese and international observers.

Policy Recommendations

Words of condemnation will not save lives in El Fasher. There are a range of actions that the international community can take in response to escalating atrocities in Sudan, but stakeholders currently lack the political will to implement them.

Diplomatic engagement

●      International stakeholders must continue to apply pressure on the external backers of this conflict which has become a global proxy war. Diplomatic engagement is needed to pressure backers such as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Turkey, Russia, and Iran to cease their material support to the RSF and SAF. All concerned states must diplomatically engage President Mohamed bin Zayed of the UAE to end Emirati support for the RSF and get the RSF to cease all atrocities against civilians in Sudan.

Civilian protection

It has been almost a year since the UN Secretary General published his recommendations on civilian protection in Sudan. This anniversary marks a year of failure by the international community to make any progress towards protecting civilians in Sudan. The greatest solution to address civilian protection threats in Sudan is a comprehensive nationwide ceasefire. Whilst such negotiations continue, the international community must urgently act:

●      Safe and voluntary evacuation routes must be secured for civilians to leave El Fasher, in compliance with UN Security Council resolution 2736. These routes must be agreed to by all armed actors in the area and accountability measures must be enacted if belligerents attack civilians who are evacuating, in violation of international humanitarian law.

●      Sudanese civil society actors require specific protections due to armed actors repeatedly targeting them. This includes local humanitarian actors including volunteers with mutual aid initiatives such as community kitchens and the emergency response rooms, human rights documenters, and journalists.  Protection support for Sudanese civil society actors must include evacuations support, safe houses, and psychosocial support.

●      Access to information is a lifesaving tool in situations of armed conflict. The RSF is benefitting from the ongoing telecommunications blackout across the Darfur region which allows them to hide the scale of the siege on El Fasher, its impacts on civilians, and their broader pattern of violations against civilians. International stakeholders should work with the Government of Chad to boost network signal from telecommunications towers along the Chadian border into Sudan. The international community must put pressure on the parties to the conflict to restore and sustain consistent telecommunication access.  

●      The siege on El Fasher also underscores the urgent need for a nationwide satellite monitoring system and greater support to Sudanese documentation groups that continue to report on violations, at significant physical risk.

Humanitarian Aid

●      Rapidly and significantly increase funding to the localised humanitarian response to allow local humanitarians to purchase food locally to distribute to communities. Donor countries urgently need to increase their direct material and financial support to grassroots mutual aid initiatives such as community kitchens and the Emergency Response Rooms.

●      Improved humanitarian access is urgently needed which requires pressure on the warring parties to allow immediate and unhindered crossline and cross-border humanitarian aid deliveries to El Fasher and the surrounding areas including major IDP settlements in Tawila, other areas of North Darfur, and to refugees in eastern Chad.

Tackling the Political Economy of War, Sanctions, and Arms Exports

●      Investigations have uncovered weapons from multiple countries being used in the Sudan war, such as Russian, Chinese, Emirati, Turkish, and European weaponry. Allies of these nations including the U.S., UK, Germany and France, should exert diplomatic pressure for an end to all arms exports to Sudan.

●      The UN Security Council must enforce, and expand the existing  Darfur arms embargo. Countries found to be in violation of the embargo should be subject to sanctions issued by the 1591 Committee.

●      The Security Council also needs to immediately appoint members to the Panel of Experts to ensure that they can fulfill their mandate.

●      States should also pursue individual, targeted sanctions against senior SAF and RSF leadership and entities that are fueling the political economy of the war. For example, countries should coordinate sanctions on Abdul Rahim Dagalo who was recorded leading RSF troops in El Fasher this week. Sanctions should be coordinated between like-minded states to ensure their effectiveness and paired with comprehensive policies on Sudan.

●      The UAE and other countries who are financing the RSF should be returned to the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) ‘grey list’ for jurisdictions under increased monitoring. The UAE was removed from the list in February 2024 because it was assessed they had reformed their Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) frameworks. The EU subsequently removed UAE from its own watchlist, even though it was noted there were “structural loopholes” allowing Dubai to serve as a “major hub for illicit financial flows.”

●      Countries and entities must also ensure their adherence to international business and human rights standards, including appropriate due diligence to ensure that their supply chains do not utilise exports of oil or gold from Sudan.