DRC News Monitor #19

News Monitor #19
6 February 2026

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Tshisekedi increasingly looks to the US for support, while Kagame remains defiant

President Tshisekedi visited Washington D.C. from February 3-5 as part of an effort to position the DRC as a key early ally to the Trump’s administration stated objectives to ‘build a minerals trading bloc intended to reduce reliance on China’. During the Critical Minerals Ministerial on February 4th, attended by the President, Glencore and the U.S.-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium signed a Memorandum of Understanding in relation to a potential acquisition by Orion of a 40% stake in Glencore’s DRC assets. Separately, on the eve of the ministerial, Canadian mining company Ivanhoe Mines announced plans to supply Congolese zinc to the U.S. under ‘Project Vault’, a strategic stockpiling initiative aimed at strengthening U.S. supply chain security for critical minerals.
During his visit in D.C., President Tshisekedi also met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum, Senate and House foreign affairs leaders, and officials with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). He was also one of the guests of honor at the ‘National Prayer Breakfast’ held at the White House.
Meanwhile, the US administration is said to be working on a series of sanctions against Rwandan ‘high security officials’. Congressman Chris Smith, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa, supported this idea in a Congress hearing on January 22nd, saying that the U.S. ‘have got to hold people to account’. However, some in Washington remain sensitive to the Rwandan narrative, under lobbying from the pro-Kigali supporters.
On February 5th, Paul Kagame publicly responded to the prospect of sanctions during the biennial Rwandan ‘National dialogue Day’ (Umushyikirano). Addressing the issue directly, Kagame stated that he would not allow himself to be ‘choked’, adding that he would rather ‘choke by being defiant and telling them to go to hell’. The remarks underscore Kigali’s confrontational posture amid rising diplomatic scrutiny and signal limited appetite for concessions under external pressure.

PAEMA AND PARTNERS

Marking the anniversary of the occupation of Goma and Bukavu, Pamoja kwa Amani issued a statement warning that ongoing diplomatic processes risk normalizing territorial occupation in eastern DRC. The coalition called for an end to what it described as “diplomacy of waiting,” urged stronger international measures against Rwanda, and announced plans to publish a report documenting the impacts of a year of occupation.
One year after the fall of Goma, PAEMA also published a statement highlighting the continued exclusion of Congolese civil society from regional and international peace processes and argues that this marginalization has contributed to a growing disconnect between diplomatic engagement and conditions on the ground.
In an opinion piece published by Foreign Policy, PAEMA’s DRC Civil Society cohort member Rebecca Kabugho, together with Sasha Lezhnev and John Prendergast of The Sentry, call on the White House to apply more sustained pressure on Rwanda. The authors argue that existing international responses have failed to shift behavior linked to ongoing instability in eastern DRC and risk reinforcing impunity in the absence of enforceable accountability measures.

DRC UPDATES

HUMAN RIGHTS

On 21 January, the interim groupement chief of Kanyabayonga (Rutshuru, North Kivu) and his wife were shot dead at their home in a targeted execution. Wazalendo militants are suspected.
On 25 January, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels killed 25 civilians in the villages of Apakulo, Ahombo and Mangwalo (Walese Vonkutu, Irumu, Ituri).
On 26 January, ADF set fire to civilian houses, a health center and part of the local catholic church in Musenge (Baswagha, Lubero). Two FARDC were killed when the army intervened.
On January 27th in Manguredjpa (Lubero, North Kivu), police opened fire on civilians during a protest staged by women to denounce ADF-related insecurity. At least two people were killed and several were injured.
On January 27th, militants from Thomas Lubanga’s CRP opened fire on people at a bar in Iga-Barriere, 25 kilometers north of Bunia, killing one and injuring three others.
On January 29th, an unidentified perpetrator threw a grenade in the market in Sange, a town twenty kilometers from Uvira. The explosion killed 3 people and injured at least 12.
On January 31st, more than a hundred people reportedly disappeared following a raid by M23 in the Bwito chiefdom of Rutshuru, North Kivu. Those targeted, primarily young men and women, were accused of collaborating with Wazalendo and FDLR elements.

ARMED CONFLICT

Ituri

Militants from Thomas Lubanga’s CRP militia are attempting to recapture the town of Bule (Djugu, Ituri), which they lost to FARDC mid-January.

North Kivu

In Walikale territory, FARDC has conducted repeated drone strikes targeting M23 positions, with operations reported on January 23rd, 24th, and 29th. Concurrently, M23 has engaged in ground clashes with Wazalendo militias in several villages in Walikale and Lubero territories. Similar clashes continue to be reported in Masisi territory and along the Masisi–Rutshuru axis, indicating sustained localized fighting across central and northern North Kivu.

South Kivu

In South Kivu, clashes are ongoing between the government-aligned coalition (FARDC supported by Wazalendo militias and Burundian forces) and an alliance comprising Twirwaneho, M23, RED-Tabara, and Gumino armed groups. Fighting remains concentrated around the strategic Point Zero area in Fizi territory, with additional clashes reported in the Minembwe highlands and around the town of Minembwe.

Tshopo

Departing significantly from its established areas of operation in eastern DRC, M23 claimed an attack near Kisangani (Tshopo province) on January 31st. According to congolese authorities, FARDC destroyed four armed suicide drones approximately 10 kilometers from the Kisangani international airport. M23 claimed responsibility for the operation, stating that it had targeted and destroyed a “drone command center” located at the airport. Kinshasa reported no human or material damage. The incident marks a notable geographic expansion of claimed M23 operations beyond its usual frontlines.

Mobondo rebellion in western DRC

Some militants associated with the Mobondo rebellion reportedly laid down their arms following a government-led ‘pacification mission’ headed by the Deputy Minister of Defense. However, violence persisted on January 26th, when refractory Mobondo elements killed a member of the pacification mission and his wife, underscoring continued resistance and fragility of stabilization efforts in Kwamouth territory.

HUMANITARIAN AND DISPLACEMENT

On 21 January, the European Union announced the release of 2 million euros in humanitarian assistance for conflict-affected communities in South Kivu.
OCHA and the DRC government launched the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, estimating a total funding requirement of USD 1.4 billion to assist 7.3 million people. The target caseload represents a reduction from 11 million people in 2025, reflecting sustained funding shortfalls rather than a decrease in humanitarian needs.
On February 3rd, independent Burundian newspaper SOS Medias reported that more than 300 Congolese refugees had died in Busuma camp (Burundi) since December 2025 raising concerns over living conditions and access to basic services.
Local sources reported that at least 40 people died from lack of medical care in Namisha (Fizi), which hosts thousands of internally displaced persons who fled fighting involving M23 and FARDC. According to these reports, no formal IDP camps have been established in the territory following instructions issued by Wazalendo elements, further constraining access to humanitarian assistance.

REPORTING AND ANALYSIS

A new report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) examines the activities of Primera Gold, a joint venture between the DRC government and a UAE-registered company, between 2022 and 2024. The report highlights an ‘opaque gold supply chain’ and identifies persistent gaps in oversight, raising questions about governance, traceability, and state involvement in artisanal and industrial gold flows.
Belgium-based Egmont Institute and DRC-based Ebuteli have both published analyses on the Allied Democratic Forces. The Egmont report argues that framing the ADF primarily through a “jihadist” lens obscures its embeddedness in local and regional political economies of violence. Ebuteli’s research focuses on the group’s expansion into Irumu, Mambasa, and Lubero territories since late 2021, situating this evolution within the context of joint FARDC–UPDF operations under Operation Shujaa.
An article published in the Review of African Political Economy argues that by engaging in peace efforts framed largely ‘on Washington’s terms’, the DRC risks prioritizing short-term diplomatic alignment over long-term political stability, potentially constraining policy autonomy and domestic legitimacy.

PEACE PROCESSES

On February 2nd in Doha, M23 and the Congolese government adopted the terms of reference of a new joint ceasefire verification and monitoring mechanism. The framework establishes two components: the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM), comprising representatives from Kinshasa and M23, and the Extended Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), tasked with technical operations and field-level verification.
On 30 January, Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe, serving as the AU-appointed mediator for peace in eastern DRC, was received in Kigali by Rwandan President Paul Kagame. The two heads of state held a bilateral meeting ahead of a broader session with the AU Panel of Facilitators (see News Monitor #18).
Ensemble pour la République (Together for the Republic), the party of opposition figure Moise Katumbi, rejected what he called a “sham dialogue” proposed by Tshisekedi and stated that any meaningful national dialogue would need to be mediated by the country’s Protestant and Catholic Churches (CENCO-ECC).

BUSINESS AND MINERALS

On January 28th, a landslide at the Rubaya coltan mine in North Kivu, under M23 control, reportedly killed more than 300 artisanal miners, many of whom were buried alive. The incident underscores the need for monitoring ongoing safety risks and governance gaps in mining areas affected under armed group control.
February 3-5, President Félix Tshisekedi visited Washington, D.C. as part of broader efforts to position the DRC as a strategic partner in U.S. initiatives to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China. During the Critical Minerals Ministerial on February 4th, attended by Tshisekedi, Glencore and the U.S.-backed Orion Critical Minerals Consortium signed a memorandum of understanding regarding a potential acquisition by Orion of a 40 percent stake in Glencore’s DRC assets. Separately, Canadian firm Ivanhoe Mines announced plans to supply Congolese zinc to the United States under ‘Project Vault’, a strategic stockpiling initiative aimed at reducing U.S. dependence on Chinese supply chains.

U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

On January 23rd, President Felix Tshisekedi met French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris, where the French president reiterated France’s ‘full support for the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’.
On February 1st, French Minister for the Francophonie Eleonore Caroit arrived in Kinshasa on a state visit amid amid indications that the DRC intends to present a candidate for the Secretary General of the OIF (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie), potentially challenging a possible third term for incumbent Louise Mushikiwabo, the former Rwandan Foreign Minister (see News Monitor #18). While Kinshasa is reportedly seeking France’s backing, Caroit emphasized that the election is based on ‘individuals rather than state candidacies’.
Also on February 1st, President Tshisekedi travelled to Abu Dhabi to sign an economic partnership agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Although the agreement spans multiple sectors, Congolese gold reportedly remains a central component, with Kinshasa seeking to redirect UAE gold imports away from Rwanda toward direct sourcing from the DRC.

USA

During his Washington visit (see ‘Minerals’ section above), President Tshisekedi also met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum, members of the Senate and House foreign affairs leadership, and officials from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). He additionally attended the National Prayer Breakfast at the White House as one of the guests of honor.
Meanwhile, the U.S. administration is reportedly considering targeted sanctions against senior Rwandan security officials, an idea supported by Congressman Chris Smith, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa during a January 22nd congressional hearing where Smith said that the United States “has got to hold people to account.” At the same time, some policymakers in Washington remain receptive to Rwanda’s narrative, amid lobbying by pro-Kigali groups.
On February 3, the U.S. Congress renewed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for one year, following its expiration in September 2025. The legislation provides eligible African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for a range of products.
Vice President J.D. Vance has assumed a more prominent role in the ‘Congo file’, as Senior Advisor Massad Boulos steps back from the portfolio.
The White House has nominated Frank Garcia, a veteran Republican Congressional aide, to lead the Africa Bureau at the State Department.
On February 10, the House Foreign Affairs Committee Africa Subcommittee will hold the second hearing in the series, Advancing Peace in DRC and Rwanda through President Trump’s Washington Accords.

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Version francophone

Tshisekedi accélère son rapprochement avec les Etats-Unis, tandis que Kagame s’assume provocateur

Du 3 au 5 février, le président Félix Tshisekedi s’est rendu à Washington dans le cadre des efforts visant à positionner la RDC comme partenaire stratégique des initiatives américaines de diversification des chaînes d’approvisionnement en minerais critiques, dans un contexte de rivalité accrue avec la Chine. Lors de la réunion ministérielle sur les minerais critiques du 4 février, à laquelle il a participé, Glencore et le consortium américain Orion Critical Minerals ont signé un protocole d’accord portant sur l’éventuelle acquisition par Orion d’une participation de 40 % dans les actifs de Glencore en RDC. A la veille de cette réunion, la société minière canadienne Ivanhoe Mines a annoncé son intention de fournir du zinc congolais aux États-Unis dans le cadre du projet « Project Vault », destiné à constituer des stocks stratégiques de minerais critiques.
En marge de cette visite, le président Tshisekedi a rencontré le secrétaire d'État Marco Rubio, le secrétaire à l’Intérieur Doug Burgum, des membres des commissions des affaires étrangères du Sénat et de la Chambre des représentants, ainsi que des représentants de la U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Il a également pris part comme l’un des invités d’honneur au National Prayer Breakfast (Petit-déjeuner national de prière) qui s’est tenu à la Maison Blanche.
Parallèlement, l’administration américaine envisagerait l’adoption d’une série de sanctions contre de hauts responsables rwandais de la sécurité. Le républicain Chris Smith, président de la sous-commission Afrique de la commission des affaires étrangères de la Chambre des représentants, a soutenu cette démarche lors d’une audience le 22 janvier où il a déclaré que les États-Unis devaient tenir [les Rwandais] «responsables de leurs actes». Toutefois, certains cercles à Washington demeurent sensibles au narratif rwandais, sous l’influence du lobby pro-Kigali.
Le 5 février, à l’occasion du Dialogue national rwandais (Umushyikirano), le président Paul Kagame a réagi publiquement à ces menaces de sanctions, déclarant qu’il ne se laisserait pas « étouffer » et qu’il préférerait « étouffer en tenant tête et en vous disant d’aller au diable ».

PAEMA et partenaires

À l’occasion de la commémoration de l’occupation de Goma et Bukavu, Pamoja kwa Amani a publié une déclaration mettant en garde contre le risque de normalisation de l’occupation territoriale dans l’est de la RDC dans le cadre des processus diplomatiques en cours. La coalition appelle à mettre fin à ce qu’elle qualifie de « diplomatie de l’attente », exhorte la communauté internationale à renforcer les mesures à l’encontre du Rwanda et annonce la publication prochaine d’un rapport documentant les conséquences d’une année d’occupation.
Séparément, PAEMA a également publié une note de réflexion, un an après la chute de Goma, dénonçant une « diplomatie sans conséquences ». La note souligne l’exclusion persistante de la société civile congolaise des processus de paix régionaux et internationaux et estime que cette marginalisation contribue à un décalage croissant entre les initiatives diplomatiques et les réalités sur le terrain.
Dans une tribune publiée dans Foreign Policy, Rebecca Kabugho, membre de la cohorte de la société civile congolaise de PAEMA, aux côtés de Sasha Lezhnev et John Prendergast (The Sentry), appelle la Maison-Blanche à exercer une pression plus significative sur le Rwanda.

ACTUALITÉS

DROITS HUMAINS

Le 21 janvier, le chef intérimaire du groupement de Kanyabayonga (Rutshuru, Nord-Kivu), et sa femme ont été abbatus à leur domicile lors d’une exécution ciblée. Selon des sources de la société civile, l’attaque serait imputable à des miliciens Wazalendo.
Le 25 janvier, les rebelles ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) ont tué 25 civils dans les villages d’Apakulo, Ahombo, et Mangwal, dans le groupement de Walese Vonkutu (territoire d’Irumu, Ituri).
Le lendemain, les ADF ont incendié des habitations de civils, un centre de santé et une partie de l’église catholique de Musenge (Baswagha, territoire de Lubero). Deux soldats des FARDC ont été tués lors des affrontements ayant suivi l’intervention de l’armée.
Le 27 janvier, la police a ouvert le feu sur des manifestants lors d’une mobilisation organisée par des femmes contre l’insécurité attribuée aux ADF à Manguredjpa (territoire de Lubero, Nord-Kivu), faisant deux morts et trois blessés.
Le même jour, des miliciens de la CRP de Thomas Lubanga ont ouvert le feu sur des civils dans un bar à Iga-Barrière, à environ 25 kilomètres au nord de Bunia (Ituri), tuant une personne et en blessant trois autres.
Le 29 janvier, un auteur non identifié a lancé une grenade sur le marché de Sange, une localité située à vingt kilomètres d'Uvira (Sud-Kivu). L’attaque a fait trois morts et douze blessés.
Le 31 janvier, plus d’une centaine de personnes auraient disparu à la suite d’un bouclage mené par le M23 dans la chefferie de Bwito (territoire de Rutshuru, Nord-Kivu). Les personnes visées, principalement de jeunes hommes et femmes, étaient accusées de collaboration avec les milices Wazalendo et les FDLR (Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda).

CONFLITS ARMÉS

Ituri

La milice CRP de Thomas Lubanga tente de reprendre le contrôle de la ville de Bule (territoire de Djugu, Ituri), perdue au profit des FARDC en mi-janvier.

Nord-Kivu

Dans le territoire de Walikale, les FARDC multiplient les frappes de drone contre des positions du M23, notamment les 23, 24, et 29 janvier. A terre, des affrontements opposent le M23 aux milices Wazalendo dans plusieurs villages. Des combats similaires ont également été signalés dans le territoire de Lubero.
Les affrontements entre les militants du M23 et les Wazalendo demeurent fréquents dans le territoire de Masisi ainsi que le long de l’axe frontalier entre les territoires de Masisi et de Rutshuru (Nord-Kivu).

Sud-Kivu

Dans le Sud-Kivu, les combats se poursuivent entre la coalition gouvernementale composée des FARDC, des milices Wazalendo et de l’armée burundaise, et une alliance regroupant Twirwaneho, le M23, RED-Tabara et Gumino. Les affrontements sont particulièrement concentrés autour du site stratégique de Point Zéro, dans le territoire de Fizi.
Des combats sont également signalés dans les hauts plateaux de Minembwe ainsi qu’aux abords de la ville de Minembwe.